In this paper we study the Kyle-Back strategic insider trading equilibrium model in which the insider has an instantaneous information on an asset, assumed to follow an OrnsteinUhlenback-type dynamics that allows possible influence by the market price. Such a model exhibits some further interplay between insider's information and the market price, and it is the first time being put into a rigorous mathematical framework of the recently developed conditional mean-field stochastic differential equation (CMFSDEs). With the help of the "reference probability measure" concept in filtering theory, we shall first prove a general well-posedness result for a class of linear CMFSDEs, which is new in the literature of both filtering theory and mean-field SDEs, and will be the foundation for the underlying strategic equilibrium model. Assuming some further Gaussian structures of the model, we find a closed form of optimal intensity of trading strategy as well as the dynamic pricing rules. We shall also substantiate the well-posedness of the resulting optimal closed-loop system, whence the existence of Kyle-Back equilibrium. Our result recovers many existing results as special cases.
Introduction
In his seminal paper, A.S. Kyle [21] first proposed a sequential equilibrium model of asset pricing with asymmetric information. The model was then extended by K. Back [2] to the continuous time version, and has since known as the Kyle-Back strategic insider trading equilibrium model.
Roughly speaking, in such a model it is assumed that there are two types of traders in a risk neutral market: one informed (insider) trader vs. many uninformed (noise) traders. The insider "sees" both (possibly future) value of the fundamental asset as well as its market value, priced by the market makers, and acts strategically in a non-competitive manner. The noise traders, on the other hand, act independently with only market information of the asset. Finally, the market makers set the price of the asset, in a Bertrand competition fashion, based on the historical information of the collective market actions of all traders, without knowing identify the insider.
The so-called Kyle-Back equilibrium is a closed-loop system in which the insider maximizes his/her expected return in a market efficient manner (i.e., following the given market pricing rule).
There has been a large number of literature on this topic. We refer to, e.g., [2, 4, 9, 14, 15, [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] and the references therein for both discrete and continuous time models. It is noted, however, that in most of these works only the case of static information is considered, that is, it is assumed that information that the insider could observe is "time-invariant", often as the fundamental price at a given future moment. Mathematically, this amounts to saying that the insider has the knowledge of a given random variable whose value cannot be detected from the market information at current time. It is often assumed that the system has a certain Gaussian structure (e.g., the future price is a Gaussian random variable), so that the optimal strategies can be calculated explicitly. The situation will become more complicated when the fundamental price progresses as a stochastic process {v t , t ≥ 0} and the insider is able to observe the price process dynamically in a "nonanticipative" manner. The asymmetric information nature of the problem has conceivably led to the use of filtering techniques in the study of the Kyle-Back model, and we refer to, e.g., [1] and [6] for the static information case, and to, e.g., [9] and [17] for the dynamic information case. It is noted that in [6] it is further assumed that the actions of noise traders may have some "memory", so that the observation process in the filtering problem is driven by a fractional Brownian motion, adding technical difficulties in a different aspect. We also note that the Kyle-Back model has been continuously extended in various directions. For example, in a static information setting, [16] recently considered the case when noise trading volatility is a stochastic process, and in the dynamic information case [10] [11] [12] studied the Kyle-Back equilibrium for the defaultable underlying asset via dynamic Markov bridges, exhibiting further theoretical potential of the problem.
In this paper we are interested in a generalized Kyle-Back equilibrium model in a dynamic in-formation setting, in which the asset dynamics is of the form of an Ornstein-Uhlenback SDE whose drift also contains market sentiment (e.g., supply and demand, earning base, etc.), quantified by the market price. The problem is then naturally imbedded into a (linear) filtering problem in which both state and observation dynamics contain the filtered signal process (see §2 for details).
We note that such a structure is not covered by the existing filtering theory, and thus it is interesting in its own right. In fact, under the setting of this paper the signal-observation dynamics form a "coupled" (linear) conditional mean-field stochastic differential equations (CMFSDEs, for short) whose well-posedness, to the best of our knowledge, is new.
The main objective of this paper is thus two-fold. First, we shall look for a rigorous framework on which the well-posedness of the underlying CMFSDE can be established. The main device of our approach is the "reference probability measure" that is often seen in the nonlinear filtering theory (see, e.g., [24] ). Roughly speaking, we give the observable market movement a "prior" probability distribution so that it is a Brownian motion that is independent of the martingale representing the aggregated trading actions of the noisy traders, and we then prove that the original signal-observation SDEs have a weak solution. More importantly, we shall prove that the uniqueness holds among all weak solutions whose laws are absolutely continuous with respect to the reference probability measure. We should note that such a uniqueness in particular resolves a long-standing issue on the Kyle-Back equilibrium model: the identification of the total traded volume movements and the innovation process of the corresponding filtering problem, which has been argued either only heuristically or by economic instinct in the literature (see, e.g., [1] ). The second goal of this paper is to identify the Kyle-Back equilibrium, that is, the optimal closed-loop system for this new type of partially observable optimization problem. Assuming a Gaussian structure and the linearity of the CMFSDEs, we give the explicit solutions to the insider's trading intensity and justify the well-posedness of the closed-loop system (whence the "existence" of the equilibrium). These solutions in particular cover many existing results as special cases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we give the preliminaries of the Kyle-Back equilibrium model and formulate the strategic insider trading problem. In section 3
we formulate a general form of linear CMFSDE and introduce the notion of its solutions and their uniqueness. We state the main well-posedness result, calculate its explicit solutions in the case of deterministic coefficients, and discuss an important extension to the unbounded coefficients case. Section 4 will be devoted to the proof of the main well-posedness theorem. In section 5
we characterize the optimal trading strategy, and give a first order necessary condition for the optimal intensity, and finally in section 6 we focus on the synthesis analysis, and validate the Kyle-Back equilibrium. In some spacial cases, we give the closed-form solutions, and compare them to the existing results.
Problem Formulation
In this section we describe a continuous time Kyle-Back equilibrium model that will be investigated in this paper, as well as related technical settings.
We begin by assuming that all randomness of the market comes from a common complete probability space (Ω, F, P) on which is defined 2-dimensional Brownian motion B = (B v , B z ), where B v = {B v t : t ≥ 0} represents the noise of the fundamental value dynamics, and B z = {B z t : t ≥ 0} represents the collective action of the noise traders. For notational clarity, we denote
: t ≥ 0} to be the filtrations generated by B v and B z , respectively, and denote F = F v ∨ F z , with the usual P-augmentation such that it satisfies the usual hypotheses (cf. e.g., [25] ).
Further, throughout the paper we will denote, for a generic Euclidean space X, regardless of its dimension, ·, · and | · | to be its inner product and norm, respectively. We denote the space of continuous functions defined on [0, T ] with the usual sup-norm by C([0, T ]; X), and we shall make use of the following notations:
• For any sub-σ-field G ⊆ F T and 1 ≤ p < ∞, L p (G; X) denotes the space of all X-valued,
it is G-measurable and bounded.
•
Throughout this paper we assume that all the processes are 1-dimensional, but higher dimensional cases can be easily deduced without substantial difficulties. Therefore, we will often drop X(= R) from the notation. Also, throughout the paper we shall denote all "L p -norms" by · p , regardless
, when the context is clear. Consider a given stock whose fundamental value (or its return) is V = {V t : t ≥ 0} traded on a finite time interval [0, T ]. There are three types of agents in the market:
(i) The insider, who directly observes the realization of the value V t at any time t ∈ [0, T ] and submits his order X t at t ∈ [0, T ].
(ii) The noise traders, who have no direct information of the given asset, and (collectively) submit an order Z t at t ∈ [0, T ] in the form
where σ z = {σ z t : t ≥ 0} is a given continuous deterministic function satisfying σ z t > 0.
(iii) The market makers, who observe only the total traded volume
and set the market price of the underlying asset at each time t, denoted by P t , based on the
to be the measure of the discrepancy between market price and fundamental value of the asset.
We now give a more precise description of the two main ingredients in the model above:
the dynamics of market price P and the fundamental value V . First, in the same spirit of the original Kyle-Back model, we can assume that the market price P is the result of a Bertrandtype competition among the market makers (cf. e.g., [4] ), and therefore should be taken as
, at each time t ≥ 0. Mathematically speaking, this amounts to saying that the market price is set to minimize the error S t , among all F Y t -measurable random variables in L 2 (Ω), hence the "best estimator" that the market maker is able to choose given the information F Y t . It is easy to see that under such a choice one must have E[(V t − P t )Y t ] = 0, that is, the market makers should expect a zero profit at each time t ∈ [0, T ]. It is worth noting that, however, unlike the static case (i.e., V t ≡ v), the process P is no longer a (P, F Y )-martingale in general.
Next, in this paper we shall also assume that the dynamics of the value of the stock V = {V t } takes the form of an Itô process: dV t = F t dt + σ v t dB v t , t ≥ 0 (this would easily be the case if, e.g., the interest rate is non-zero). Furthermore, we shall assume that the drift F t = F (t, V t , P t ), t ≥ 0.
Here, the dependence of F on the market price P t is based on the following rationale: the value of the stock is often affected by factors such as supply and demand, the earnings base (cash flow per share), or more generally, the market sentiment, which all depend on the market price of the stock. Consequently, taking the Gaussian structure into consideration, in what follows we shall assume that the process V satisfies the following linear SDE:
where the functions f t , g t , h t and σ v t are all deterministic continuous differentiable functions with respect to time t ∈ [0, T ], and N (v 0 , s 0 ) is a normal random variable with mean v 0 and standard deviation s 0 .
Continuing, given the Gaussian structure of the dynamics, it is reasonable to assume that the insider's optimal trading strategy (in terms of "number of shares") is of the form (see, e.g., [1, 2, 4, 17, 21] ):
where β t > 0 is a deterministic continuous differentiable function with respect to time t in [0, T), known as the insider trading intensity. Consequently, it follows from (2.2) that the total traded volume process observed by the market makers can be expressed as
We note that SDEs (2.3) and (2.5) form a (linear) conditional mean-field SDE (CMFSDE), which is beyond the scope of the traditional filtering theory. Such SDE have been studied in [8] and [13] in general nonlinear forms, but none of them covers the one in this form. In fact, if we further allow the function h in (2.3) to be an F Y -adapted process, as many stochastic control problems do, then (2.3) and (2.5) would become a fully convoluted CMFSDE whose wellposedness, to the best of our knowledge, has not been studied in the literature, even in the linear form. We should mention that the equation (2.5) in the case when V t ≡ v was already noted in [1] and [6] , but without addressing the uniqueness of the solution. In the next sections we shall establish a mathematical framework so these SDEs can be studied rigorously.
Given the dynamics (2.3) and (2.5), our main purpose now is to find an optimal trading intensity β for the insider to maximize his/her expected wealth, whence the Kyle-Back equilibrium.
More specifically, denote the wealth process of the insider by W = {W t : t ≥ 0}, and assume that the strategy is self-financing (cf. e.g., [7] ), then the total wealth of the insider over time duration
[0, T ], based on the market price made by the market makers, should be
Here in the above we used a simple integration by parts and definition (2.4). Thus the optimization problems can be described as
Remark 2.1. We should remark that the simple form of optimization problem (2.7) is due largely to the linearity of the dynamics (2.3) and (2.5), as well as the Gaussian assumption on the initial state v. These lead to a Gaussian structure, whence the trading strategy (2.4). The general nonlinear and/or non-Gaussian Kyle-Back model requires further study of CMFSDE and associated filtering problem, and one should seek optimal control from a larger class of "admissible controls". In that case the first order condition studied in this paper will become a Pontryagin type stochastic maximum principle (see, for example, [8] ), and the solution is expected to be much more involved. We will address such general problems in our future publications.
We end this section by noting that the main idea for solving the CMFSDE is to introduce the so-called reference probability space in nonlinear filtering literature (see, e.g., [24] ), which can be described as follows.
Assumption 2.2. There exists a probability space (Ω 0 , F 0 , Q 0 ) on which the process (B v t , Y t ), t ∈ [0, T ], is a 2-dimensional continuous martingale, where B v is a standard Brownian motion and Y is the observation process with quadratic variation Y t = t 0 (σ z s ) 2 ds. The probability measure Q 0 will be referred to as the reference measure.
We remark that Assumption 2.2 amounts to saying that we are giving a prior distribution to the price process Y = {Y t : t ≥ 0} that the market maker is observing, which is not unusual in statistical modeling, and will facilitate the discussion greatly. A natural example is the canonical space:
, the space of all 2-dimensional continuous functions null at zero;
process. In the case σ z ≡ 1, Q 0 is the Wiener measure.
The Linear Conditional Mean-field SDEs
In this section we study the linear conditional mean-field SDEs (CMFSDE) (2.3) and (2.5) that play an important role in this paper. In fact, let us consider a slightly more general case that is useful in applications:
where
) is a standard Brownian motion defined on a given probability space (Ω, F, P),
In light of Assumption 2.2, throughout this section we shall assume the following:
, and H are all deterministic, continuous functions; and
, is a 2-dimensional continuous martingale, such that B 1 is a standard Q 0 -Brownian motion, and
Remark 3.2. The Assumption 3.1-(iii) amounts to saying that the process h is defined on the reference probability space (Ω 0 , F 0 , Q 0 ), and adapted to the Brownian filtration F Y , as we often see in the stochastic control with partial observations (cf. [5] ).
The General Result
To simplify notations in what follows we shall assume that σ 1 = σ 2 ≡ 1. We first introduce two definitions of the solution to CMFSDE (3.1). Let P(R) denote all probability measures on (R, B(R)), where B(R) is the Borel σ-field of R, and µ ∼ N (v 0 , s 0 ) ∈ P(R) denotes the normal distribution with mean v 0 and variance s 0 .
(iii) X 0 ∼ µ; and is independent of (B 1 , B 2 ) under P.
there exists a probability measure P 0 on (Ω 0 , F 0 ), and processes
, whose law under P 0 is the same as that of (X, Y, B 1 , B 2 ) under P; and
In what follows for any Q 0 -weak solution, we shall consider only its copy on the reference measurable space (Ω 0 , F 0 ), and we shall still denote the solution by (X, Y, B 1 , B 2 ).
The uniqueness of the solutions to CMFSDE (3.1) is a more delicate issue. In fact, even the weak uniqueness (in the usual sense) for CMFSDE (2.3) and (2.5) is not clear. However, we have a much better hope, at least in the linear case, for Q 0 -solutions. We first introduce the following "Q 0 -pathwise uniqueness".
Definition 3.5. The CMFSDE (3.1) is said to have "Q 0 -pathwise uniqueness" if for any two Moreover, if we denote
where S t =Var(P t ) satisfies the Riccati equation:
Furthermore, the weak solution can be chosen as Q 0 -weak solution, and the Q 0 -pathwise uniqueness holds.
We remark that Theorem 3.6 does not imply that CMFSDE (3.1) has a strong solution, as not every weak solution is a Q 0 -weak solution. The proof of Theorem 3.6 is a bit lengthy, we shall defer it to next section. We nevertheless present a lemma below, which will be frequently used in our discussion, so as to facilitate the argument in the next section.
To begin with, we consider any filtered probability space (Ω, F, F, P) on which is defined a standard Brownian Motion (B 1 t , B 2 t ). We assume that
we define L η to be the solution to the following SDE,
In other words, L η is a local martingale in the form of the Doléans-Dade stochastic exponential:
and consider the following SDE:
(A simple case would be h(y) t =h(y t ), whereh is a measurable function.) We should note that in general the wellposedness of SDE (3.6) is non-trivial without any specific conditions on h, but in what follows we shall assume a priori that (3.6) has a (weak) solution on some probability space (Ω, F, P). We
We have the following lemma. 
on some probability space (Ω, F, P). Let β be given by
Assume further that L −(α+h) , the solution to (3.4) with η = −(α + h), is an (F, P)-martingale.
Then, for any t ∈ [0, T ], it holds that
, as the cases for t < T are analogous. To this end, we define a new probability measure Q on (Ω, F T ) by
where L −(α+h) is the solution to the SDE (3.4) with η = −(α + h), and it is a true martingale on 
, thenL satisfies the following SDE on (Ω, F T , Q):
Furthermore, by the Kallianpur-Striebel formula, we have
On the other hand,L has the explicit form:
Note that h is F Y -adapted, so isL 0 T . We derive from (3.10) that Y ) is a standard Brownian motion under Q, and α is F B 1 -adapted, we conclude that α t is independent of Y t under Q. Therefore, using integration by parts we obtain that
Since α is independent of Y under Q, and 14) proving the lemma.
Deterministic Coefficient Cases
An important special case is when all the coefficients in the linear CMFSDE (3.1) are deterministic.
In this case we expect that the solution (X, Y ) is Gaussian, and it can be solved in a much more explicit way. The following linear CMFSDE will be useful in the study of insider trading equilibrium model in the latter half of the paper.
where v ∼ N (v 0 , s 0 ) and is independent of (B 1 , B 2 ) and all the coefficients are assumed to be deterministic.
Bounded Coefficients Case
In light of Theorem 3.6 let us introduce the following functions:
where S is the solution to the following Riccati equation
Proposition 3.8. Let Assumption 3.1 be in force, and assume further that the process h in (3.1) is also a deterministic and continuous function. Let (X, Y ) be the solution of (3.15) on the probability space (Ω, F, P), and denote P t = E P [X t |F Y t ], t ≥ 0. Then X and P have the following explicit forms respectively: for t ≥ 0, it holds P-a.s. that
where, for 0 ≤ r ≤ t,
(3.20)
Proof. We first note that the SDE (3.15) is a special case of (3.1) with G = −H. Then, following the same argument of Theorem 3.6 one can show that when σ 1 > 0 and σ 2 > 0 are not equal to 1, the SDE (3.2) for the process 21) and S t satisfies a Riccati equation
Now applying the Girsanov transformation we can define a new probability measure Q under which (B 1 , Y ) is a continuous martingale, such that B 1 is a standard Brownian motion, and
Then, under Q, the dynamic of V t △ = X t − P t can be written as
It then follows that the identity (3.18) holds Q-almost surely, and hence P-almost surely.
Similarly, applying the constant variation formula for the linear SDE (3.21) and noting (3.1)
we obtain that, with φ 2 (t, r) = exp( t r (f u + g u )du), for 0 ≤ r, t ≤ T ,
Now plugging (3.18) into (3.23), and applying Fubini, we have
where φ 3 (t, r)
This proves (3.19) , whence the proposition.
Unbounded Coefficients Case
We note that Theorem 3.6 as well as the discussion so far rely heavily on the assumption that all the coefficients are bounded, especially H and G (see Assumption 3.1). However, in our applications we will see that the coefficients H = −G = β, where β is the insider trading intensity which, at least in the optimal case, will satisfy lim t→T − β t = +∞, violating Assumption 3.1. In other words, the closed-loop system will exhibit a certain Brownian "bridge" nature (see also, e.g., [4, 10, 11] ), for which the well-posedness result of Theorem 3.6 actually does not apply.
To overcome such a conflict, we introduce the following relaxed version of Assumption 3.1.
Assumption 3.9. There exists a sequence {T n } n≥1 , with 0 < T n ր T , and a sequence of proba-
We shall refer to the sequence of probability measures Q 0 := {Q n } n≥1 as the reference family of probability measures, and the associated sequence {T n } n≥1 as the announcing sequence. Clearly, if the reference measure Q 0 exists, then Q n = Q 0 | F 0
Tn
, n ≥ 1. It is known, however, that in the dynamic observation case the Kyle-Back equilibrium may only exist on [0, T ) (see, e.g. [12] and the references cited therein). In such a case the reference family would play a fundamental role.
A reasonable extension of the notion of Q 0 -weak solution over [0, T ) is as follows.
Definition 3.10. Let Q 0 be a reference family of probability measures, with announcing sequence 
Proof of Theorem 3.6
In this section we prove Theorem 3.6. We begin by making the following reduction: it suffices to consider the SDE (3.1) where the initial state X 0 = v ≡ v 0 is deterministic, that is, s 0 = 0. Indeed, suppose that (X x , Y x ) is a weak solution of (3.1) along with some probability space (Ω, F, P) and P-Brownian motion (B 1 , B 2 ), and v is any random variable defined on (R, B(R)), with normal distribution µ △ = N (v 0 , s 0 ), we define the product spacẽ
and write generic element ofω ∈Ω asω = (ω, x). Then for each t ≥ 0, the mappingω → X x t (ω) defines a random variable on (Ω,F,P), and x → X x 0 △ = v(x) is a normal random variable with distribution N (v 0 , s 0 ) and is independent of (B 1 , B 2 ), by definition. Bearing this in mind, throughout the section we shall assume that the initial state X 0 = x is deterministic.
Existence
Our main idea to prove the existence of the weak solution is to "decouple" the state and observation equations in (3.1) by considering the dynamics of the filtered state process P t △ = E P [X t |F Y t ], t ≥ 0, which is known to satisfy an SDE, thanks to linear (Kalman-Bucy) filtering theory.
To be more precise, we consider the following system of SDEs on the reference probability space (Ω, F, Q 0 ), on which (B 1 , Y ) is a Brownian motion:
We note that by Assumption 3.1, all coefficients f, g, H, G are deterministic and
, it is easy to see that the linear system (4.1) has a (pathwisely) unique solution (X t , B 2 t , P t ) on (Ω, F, Q 0 ). Now let L = {L t } t≥0 be the solution to the SDE:
Furthermore, L can be written as the Doléans-Dade exponential:
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. Assume that Assumption 3.1 holds, and further that h is bounded. Then the process
Proof. We follow the idea of that in [5] . Since L is a supermartingale with
To this end, we define, for any ε > 0,
, and an easy application of Itô's formula shows that
Since for each fixed ε > 0,
we see that the stochastic integral on the right hand side of (4.4) is a true martingale. It then
follows that
Next, we observe that L t > 0, and
Note that L ε is bounded. By sending ε → 0 on both sides of (4.5) and applying Dominated
Convergence Theorem we can then conclude that
It remains to check (4.6). To this end, let us define
By Gronwall's inequality, it is readily seen that
Here and in the sequel C > 0 denotes a generic constant depending only on the bounds of the coefficients f, g, H, G, h, and the duration T > 0, which is allowed to vary from line to line. Now, noting that L t is a super-martingale with L 0 = 1, we deduce from (4.8) that
Consequently we have
Continuing, let us recall that the processes P and α satisfy (4.1) and (4.7), respectively. By
Itô's formula we see that
where M t
Next, we define, for δ > 0 and t ∈ [0, T ],
, ∀t; and it is not hard to show that lim δ→0 X δ = X, lim δ→0 P δ = P , uniformly on [0, T ], in probability. Now, define
Since X δ and P δ are now bounded, L δ is a martingale and
Furthermore, by the stability of SDEs one shows that, possibly along a subsequence, L δ t converges to L t , Q 0 -a.s.,
Noting (4.11) and applying Itô's formula we have, for
Since α has finite moments for all orders (see (4.7)), the boundedness of X δ and P δ then renders the two stochastic integrals on the right hand side above both true martingales. Thus, taking expectations on both sides above, and applying Gronwall's inequality, we get
where C is a constant independent of δ. Applying Fatou's Lemma we then get that
Finally, noting (4.11) and applying Itô's formula again we have
By similar arguments as before, and noting that |X δ t | ≤ |X t | and |P δ | ≤ |P t |, one shows
This, together with (4.9), implies that
Applying the Gronwall inequality and recalling (4.13) we then obtain
This, together with (4.14) and (4.10), leads to (4.6). The proof is now complete.
We can now complete the proof of existence. Since L t is a (F, Q 0 ) martingale, we define a probability measure P by dP dQ 0 F T = L T , and apply the Girsanov Theorem so that (B 1 , B 2 ) is a P-Brownian motion on [0, T ]. Now, by looking at the first two equations of (4.1), we see that
(Ω, F, P, X, Y, B 1 , B 2 ) would be a weak solution to (3.1) if we can show that
To prove (4.17) we proceed as follows. We consider the following linear filtering problem on the space (Ω, F, P):
(4.18)
Then by linear filtering theory, we know that α satisfies the following SDE: 19) where S t satisfies (3.3) (or (4.1)). On the other hand, from (4.18) we see that α is F B 1 -adapted, and from (4.1) we see that P is F Y -adapted, therefore we can apply Lemma 3.7 to conclude that
Recall that X = X 1 + α, where X 1 satisfies a randomized ODE (4.7) and is obviously F Y -adapted, we see that P = X 1 + α, and it satisfies the SDE:
Note that X = X 1 + α andP = X 1 + α we see that
Then (4.20) implies that
Define ∆P t = P t − P t , then it follows from (4.1) and (4.21) that
Thus ∆P t ≡ 0, P-a.s., for any t ≥ 0. That is, (4.17) holds, proving the existence.
It is worth noting that the weak solution that we have constructed is actually a Q 0 -weak solution.
Uniqueness
Again we need only consider the solutions with deterministic initial state. We first note that if
) is a Q 0 -weak solution to (3.1), then we can assume without loss of generality that F 0 = F B 1 ,B 2 , hence Brownian. Next, we can define
. We are to show that P t satisfies an SDE of the form as that in (4.1) under Q 0 , from which we shall derive the Q 0 -pathwise uniqueness.
To this end, we recall that, as a Q 0 -weak solution, one has P ∼ Q 0 . Define a P-martingale
is a P-semi-martingale with decomposition:
and A = (A 1 , A 2 ) is a finite variation process. Since by assumption (B 1 , Y ) is Q 0 -Brownian motion, we have A ≡ 0. In other words, it must hold that
Consider now a (F, P)-martingale dM t = Z −1 t dZ t . Since F is Brownian, applying Martingale Representation Theorem we see that there exists a process θ = (
Comparing this to (4.22) we have θ 1 ≡ 0 and θ 2 ≡ −(HX + G P ). That is, Z = L −(HX+G P ) , the solution to the SDE:
and hence it can be written as the Doléans-Dade stochastic exponential:
Let us now consider again the following filtering problem on probability space (Ω, F, P).
As before, we know that α t = E P [α t |F β t ] satisfies the SDE:
where S t satisfies (3.3). Since L −(HX+G P ) = Z is a P-martingale, we can apply Lemma 3.7 again
t , and Y t = β t + Y 1 t as before, where X 1 satisfies the ODE (4.7), and Y 1 satisfies the ODE
Furthermore, since X 1 t is F Y -adapted, we have P t = X 1 t + α t . Combining (4.7) and (4.26) we see that P t satisfies the SDE:
(4.28)
Since β = Y − Y 1 , we derive from (4.27) that
and (4.28) becomes
That is, P t satisfies the same SDE as P t does in (4.1) on the reference space (Ω, F, Q 0 ).
To finish the argument, let (Ω, F, P i , F, X i , Y i , B 1,i , B 2,i ), i = 1, 2 be any two Q 0 -weak solutions, and define
Then the arguments above show that (X i , B 2,i , P i ), i = 1, 2, are two solutions to the linear system of SDEs (4.1), under Q 0 . Thus if
which in turn shows, in light of (4.24) , that P 1 = P 2 . This proves the Q 0 -pathwise uniqueness of solutions to (3.1).
Necessary Conditions for Optimal Trading Strategy
In this section we study the optimization problem (2.7). We still denote the price dynamics observable by the insider to be V = {V t : t ≥ 0}, and assume that it satisfies the SDE:
and we assume that the demand dynamics observable by the market makers, denoted by Y = {Y t : t ≥ 0}, satisfies the SDE
We should note that in (5.1) and (5.
2) the probability P should be understood as one defined on the canonical space (Ω 0 , F 0 , F 0 ), on which the solution to (5.1) and (5.2) is Q 0 -pathwisely unique. For notational simplicity, from now on we shall denote E = E P , when there is no danger of confusion. Moreover, note that
and that all the coefficients are now assumed to be deterministic, we can apply Proposition 3.8
to write the problem (2.7) as
where φ i , i = 1, 2, 3, and l, k are defined by (3.20) and (3.16), respectively, with H = β. Now by integration by parts we can easily check that
we thus have J(β) = φ 2 (T, 0) T 0 β t S t φ 1 (0, t)φ 3 (T, t)dt, and the original optimal control problem (2.7) is equivalent to the following
Before we proceed any further let us specify the "admissible strategy" and the standing assumptions on the coefficients that will be used throughout this section. We note that the assumptions will be slightly stronger than Assumption 3.1. 
Remark 5.2. (i)
In practice it is not unusual to assume that lim t→T − β t = ∞, which amounts to saying that the insider is desperately trying to maximize the advantage of the asymmetric information (cf. e.g., [1] ). We shall actually prove that this is the case for the optimal strategy, provided the Assumption 5.1-(ii) holds. In what follows we say that a trading intensity β is admissible if it satisfies Assumption 5.1-(ii). By a slight abuse of notations we still denote all admissible trading intensities by U ad .
(ii) For β ∈ U ad , the well-posedness of CMFSDEs (5.1) and (5.2) should be understood in the sense of Theorem 3.11, and we shall consider its (unique) Q 0 -solution.
We note that the solution of the Riccati equation (3.17) S, as well as the functions φ 1 and φ 3 defined by (3.20) , depends on the choice of trading intensity β. We shall at times denote them by S β , φ β 1 , and φ β (ii) To find the bound that is independent of the choice of β, we note that
Thus the result then follows from the Gronwall's inequality.
(iii) Since G is quadratic in s, and lim s→∞ G(t, s, β) = −∞, it is easy to see from (5.5) that, for any given β ∈ U ad , max t,s
On the other hand, we write
where I ± are defined in an obvious way. Since I + (·) and I − (·) are monotone increasing, both limits I + (T − ) and I − (T − ) exist, which may be +∞. But (5.6) implies that I + (T − ) < ∞, and
(iv) We rewrite the equation (3.17) as follows (recall the definition of φ 1 (3.20)),
Thus, the result follows easily from (iii). This completes the proof.
In the rest of the section we shall try to solve the optimization problem (5.4). We first note that by definition the quantity S and hence φ 1 and φ 3 all depend on the choice of trading intensity function β. Therefore (5.4) is essentially a problem of calculus of variation. We shall proceed by first looking for the first order necessary conditions, and then find the conditions that are sufficient for us to determine the optimal strategy.
To begin with, let us denote, for any differentiable functional F :
any β, ξ ∈ C([0, T ]), the directional derivative of F at β in the direction ξ by
We first give some useful directional derivatives that will be used frequently in the sequel.
Recall the solution S to the Riccati equation (3.17) , and the functions φ 1 and φ 3 , defined by (3.20) . Note that they are all functionals of the trading intensity β ∈ C([0, T ]).
(2) Furthermore, lim t→T − β t = ∞, and consequently, lim t→T − S t = 0. In particular,
Proof. Suppose that β ∈ U ad is an optimal strategy of the problem (2.7). Then it is also an optimal of the problem (5.4). Thus for any function ξ ∈ C([0, T ]), it holds that
or equivalently,
Then substituting ∇ ξ β, ∇ ξ S, and ∇ ξ φ i , i = 1, 2, 3 in Lemma 5.4 into (5.9) and changing the order of integration if necessary we obtain that, formally,
To justify the identity (5.10) we now show that both sides of (5.10) are finite for any β ∈ U ad (note that it is possible that β t → ∞, as t → T − ). To this end, we first note that φ 1 (t, 0) and φ 2 (r, s) are bounded, and
thus it is also bounded, and clearly lim t→T φ 3 (T, t) = 0. Furthermore, we rewrite (5.11) as 13) where G(t, T ) △ = φ 1 (t, 0)φ 2 (0, t) − φ 3 (T, t) = φ 1 (T, 0)φ 2 (0, T ) + T t g r φ 1 (r, 0)φ 2 (0, r)dr, thanks to (5.12). We claim that the following integral 
14)
It remains to prove part (1) . But note that φ 1 (T, 0) = 0, we see from (5.13) that Ψ t = Φ t , as
G(t, T ) =
T t g r φ 1 (r, 0)φ 2 (0, r)dr. Thus (1) follows directly from (5.10).
Remark 5.6. (i) Theorem 5.5 amounts to saying that, similar to the static information case (cf. e.g., [1, 17] ), the optimal strategy β for the optimization problem (2.7) should also maximize the advantage on the asymmetry of information near the terminal time T , i.e., lim t→T − β t = ∞.
Also, in equilibrium, such asymmetry of the information will disappear at the terminal time since S T = lim t→T − S t = 0, that is, P T = E P [V T |F Y T ] = V T , P-a.s., despite the fact that the insider only observes V t at time t < T (see also, e.g., [4, [10] [11] [12] ).
(ii) Although Theorem 5.5 gives only the necessary condition of the optimal strategy, the well-posedness of the optimal closed-loop system is guaranteed by Theorem 3.11. In other words, combining Theorem 5.5 and Theorem 3.11 we have proved the existence of the Kyle-Back equilibrium for the problem (2.3)-(2.7) under our assumptions.
Worked-out Cases and Examples
In general, it is not easy to find out an closed-form optimal strategy for the original problem (2.7), although we somehow predicted its behavior in Theorem 5.5. In this subsection we consider a special case for which the optimal strategy can be found explicitly. We show that it does possess the properties that we presented in the last sections, which in a sense justifies our results. More precisely, we shall consider a case where the market price does not impact the underlying asset Then, the solution to the optimization problem (2.7) is given as follows:
(i) the optimal strategy is given by β t = α 0 φ 2 (t, 0)(σ z t ) 2 2S t ;
(ii) the error variance of price P t S t = φ (iv) the market price is given by
(v) finally, it holds that lim t→T − β t = ∞, lim t→T − S t = 0, and in particular, Furthermore, one can easily check that, for t ∈ [0, T ], the corresponding market price is given by
and the corresponding mean square error is
In particular, S T = 0, which implies that V 0 = P T , P-a.s. These results coincide with those of [1] .
If we further assume that T = 1 and σ z t ≡ σ, where σ > 0 is a constant, then the optimal trading intensity becomes
the corresponding expected payoff is J(β) = σ √ S 0 , and the corresponding market price is P t = v 0 + √ S 0 σ Y t , 0 ≤ t < T . We recover the results of Back [2] .
2. Long-lived information case. We now compare our results with that of Back-Pedersen [4] (see also Danilova [17] ), in which the insider continuously observes the dynamics of V t that is assumed to be a martingale.
By setting T = 1, f ≡ 0, g ≡ 0, h ≡ 0 and σ z ≡ 1, Theorem 6.1 implies The corresponding expected payoff is J(β) = 1, and the corresponding market price is P t = v 0 +Y t , 0 ≤ t < T .
